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The perils of prophecy are plain. The prophet can be wrong. Even if
the prophecy is reasonably accurate, few will remember. Credit given will
be limited. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that as a calling or
even as a pastime, it enlists only a small band, those attracted, perhaps, by
the sporting nature of the game. For those intrepid souls willing to
exercise the prophetic ken there are, fortunately, a few Canons on
Soothsaying designed to minimize the inevitable risks. One of the first
and most widely accepted Canons is never to prophesy what will happen
tomorrow, for a prophesy might be remembered over that time span.
Moreover, the batting average is too quickly and easily computed. A
second Canon is to prophesy in ambiguous terms and conflicting
directions-thereby improving the prospect that something prophesied
can be related in some fashion to whatever it is that happens later. Finally,
the prophecy should never, never be committed to writing. A written
prophecy has a half life of incalculable length, a defect of major
proportions. Worse still, since the loose leaf technology has not yet been
applied to the art of prophecy, a written prophecy lends itself neither to
revision nor repudiation. Prophecy should be only by word of mouth and
preferably only through hearsay.
The Editors of the Journal have, of course, violated the last and most
important Canon of Prophecy, in this issue of their otherwise distinguish-
ed publication. What retribution the shades of departed prophets will visit
upon them in the years that lie ahead will not be forecast here-but the
deserts will surely be just, and tailored to the crime.
Forecasting the future of the law or any part thereof founders on the
hard fact that the law is simply a handmaiden of the society it serves. It is
human society, its values, organization, and technology, that shapes the
law and not the reverse. As the late, distinguished Lord Radcliffe
recognized, "Every system of jurisprudence needs . . . a constant
preoccupation with the task of relating its rules and principles to the
fundamental moral assumptions of the society to which it belongs."' He
also identifies as the fundamental moral assumption of the free world a
"commit[ment] for good to the principle that the purpose of society and all
its institutions is to nourish and enrich the growth of each individual
human spirit."2 In a moving society, however, technological change and
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its impact on living patterns means the objective of maximizing the growth
and development of the individual itself becomes a moving target. To serve
society, the law must change with its master. In another setting Lord
Radcliffe observed:
No one really doubts that the common law is a body of law which develops in
process of time in response to the developments of the society in which it
rules. Its movement may not be perceptible at any distinct point of time, nor
can we always say how it gets from one point to another, but I do not think
that, for all that, we need abandon the conviction of Galileo that somehow, by
some means, there is a movement that takes place.3
I. CHANGES IN TORT LAW WILL BE SLOW
Despite great and far reaching changes in the setting for life and the
organization of society, changes in tort law have been evolutionary and
relatively slow. In torts we still, in theory at least, process most of the
social dislocations resulting from traffic injuries by reference to a backdrop
of common-law propositions originally worked out to serve the horse and
buggy era of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Society exhibits an
amazing tolerance for this system of processing injury claims, which is
widely regarded as inefficient, costly, and otherwise disadvantageous to the
entire justice system.
After intense scrutiny, however, reform proposals frequently are seen
to have deficiencies of their own. Thus, the reluctance to embrace
sweeping change in a system that does function, after a fashion, is
understandable. Tolerance for a system of tort law that falls measurably
short of the ideal reflects an instinctive conservatism reinforced by special
pleas of those with a stake in the present system. It is, after all, a system
that is established and functional. Tolerance for the status quo is
particularly marked in "private law," which governs the rights of citizens
inter se, as contrasted with "public law," which deals with the relationship
of citizen and government. Tort law is freighted, of course, with public
interest, but it is not often seen as presenting public or political issues.
Apart from occasional panic over the level of insurance rates, tort law
tends to be very much in the background of public interest or legislative
attention.
For these reasons, the next twenty years may see changes in tort law as
modest as the changes of the past twenty or thirty years. Those changes
have included elimination of many immunity doctrines, easing of the
plaintiff's burden in product liability cases by shifting to strict liability
standards for defective products, adoption of comparative negligence by
statute or court decision, expansion of liability for fright-transmitted
injuries, abandonment of auto guest statutes, and enlargement of the
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landowner's duty of care to those on his premises. These modest patches
on the system have effected very little change in the basic system itself.
One who would prophesy the future by looking to the past, a standard
prophetic technique, could offer at least a short-run prophecy that tort law
will creak along for twenty or thirty more years with relatively insignificant
alterations.
Even if some modest form of "no fault" automobile insurance is
adopted widely, it is likely to be a product of political compromise that will
leave much of the torts system operational even with respect to traffic
injuries. We should not forget that although "no fault" insurance
proposals for traffic injuries have been debated for nearly fifty years, only a
modest beginning has been made toward their establishment.
The early years of the next century should find tort law very much as it
is now. That is not to say that there will not be changes. On the common-
law side, the trend will be to open the courthouse door more widely. There
will be increased willingness of the courts to hear cases concerning injury
resulting from fright or shock. Immunities will continue to disappear.
The doctrine of comparative negligence will be universally accepted.
Arbitration will make further inroads as the process of choice for
determining modest-sized claims. Class actions may become accepted as
a means for dealing with certain mass claims. These will be incremental,
evolutionary developments that moderately alter the shape of tort law but
not its fundamental nature.
At the same time, popular panic over the level of insurance rates,
together with well-organized lobbies, may spur the legislature to "reform"
the law of torts by limiting liability through such devices as shorter statutes
of limitation, screening panels, and piece-meal tinkering with the
"collateral source" rule. These measures, already established in some
jurisdictions, offer only slight economy to the handling of personal injury
claims. Moreover, they contain the seeds of injustice in their irrational
refusal to entertain some meritorious claims, and may well be found
wanting under state constitutional provisions that can be read to require
rational responses to demonstrated shortcomings of the tort law system.
II. FURTHER INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Longer range prophesy must be seen as a high risk enterprise, an
ultrahazardous activity but surely one not appropriate for imposition of
strict liability. Long range prophesy concerning the future of the law of
torts must come to grips with the nature of changes to be expected in the
social condition in this country a half century or a century from now.
There are a number of forces or factors that may markedly alter the
pattern of life.
What of the pressure of population? Perhaps inside the United States
we are about to level off our population growth. The population pressure
of an urbanized society in this country already exerts an insidious pressure
(Vol. 39:782
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on the legal system and the law of torts. It is not just a matter of court
congestion in the urban centers. Our densely populated urbanized society
marred by segregated housing patterns and bedroom suburbs, has, thanks
to the automobile and modern technology, given us a society of strangers.
Few of us know our geographic neighbors. There is a weakened sense of
community, of relating. From this sense of alienation come pressures
that must in time affect the law of torts. Litigation for placing the blame
and providing vindication in the anonymous society simply does not yield
the satisfactions that once may have come from this exercise in community
peer assessment-especially when it is really a faceless insurer who is
hauled into court. Suing becomes a costly, long delayed, impersonal
exercise that is less attractive as other alternatives become available.
With the decline of older forms of social subgroups, such as the
church, we can expect more groups to organize and speak in what they see
as their self-interest. Such self-interest groups will surely include some
that recognize the very real stake that all members of society, all potential
injury victims of the technological age, have in the system of compensation
that responds to the accident toll of such a society. But even before such
groups begin to be heard on the subject of the tort compensation system,
they will be heard on significant aspects of the broader problems of injury
and illness-the costs of medical care and the need for continued income
during periods away from the job.
Despite the contemporary phenomenon of the "taxpayer's revolt,"
evidenced by adoption of Proposition 13 in California, we will surely
adopt a national system to assure comprehensive medical care, whether
administered by government or private companies, or both, by the next
century. There will also exist minimum wage and salary continuation
plans for virtually all employed persons. At that point the "collateral
source" rule, which sanctions tort recoveries for medical expenses and lost
income unreduced by coverage from other sources, will be too much of an
anomaly. The emerging issue may well be whether it makes sense to
compensate economic loss in piecemeal "no fault" programs or to go the
full distance and opt for comprehensive social insurance coverage, through
private carriers or government, for medical care costs and all interruption
of employment income due to sickness or accident. In such a system of
economic security for the individual would there be a place for negligence
law? The New Zealand Royal Commission, which studied the problem in
1967, proposed adoption of a broad social insurance system and also
recommended that "the common law rights in respect of personal injuries
should be abolished and the Workers' Compensation Act repealed." 4
Even under a system that assures compensation for economic loss and
provides medical care, including full costs of rehabilitation, the civil trial
process may continue to serve a need for individualized consideration of
4. ROYAL COMMISSION, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND 180 (1967).
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physical injury cases. Punitive damages, occasionally disparaged, may
perform a function in extreme cases, such as drunken driving or battery by
automobile. Preservation in appropriate circumstances of a private
remedy for punitive damages, perhaps reinforced by recovery of attorney's
fees, could provide a useful sanction. To rely on the criminal process to
punish these less than heinous offenses is unrealistic. Prosecutorial staffs
will almost certainly be more overloaded in the next century than they are
now.
As for pain and suffering, an increasingly affluent society could
certainly afford to continue paying such damages. As the public comes to
see that it ultimately pays those awards through increased insurance
premiums, costs of goods and services, or taxes, it seems unlikely that we,
as voters, will become enthused about the speculative process of
converting pain into dollars. The troublesome problem of permanent
impairments that subtract from the capacity for the ordinary pleasures of
life, such as the loss of sight or a limb, does call for recognition under any
system of compensation. A monetary award for noneconomic loss,
related perhaps to the economic loss and the degree of impairment of
function, might give a rough but acceptable recognition of injuries that
permanently handicap the "pursuit of happiness."
One of the virtues of the old common-law system of liability for
personal injuries was the opportunity that it provided for individualization
of damage assessment. Truly individualized damage assessment is more
appealing than any schedule of benefits or even indiv.dualized assessment
subject to a prescribed ceiling. Loss assessment may continue to
accommodate individualization appropriately in administrative process-
ing of damage issues limited to measuring economic loss.
The new society will run short of fossil fuels but the mind of man will
surely find a way to make the resources of nature sustain an even higher
level of human energy consumption. We will in the next century be an
even more mobile, transient society. Perhaps in that new age, science will
design modes of transport and recreation marvelously freed from the risk
of collision and bloodletting. Traffic personal injury claims would then
wither away for the best of all reasons. But if our commitment to
locomotion for business and pleasure continues, it is perhaps even more
likely that our ability to unintentionally inflict horrendous physical injury
upon each other will increase. The forecast offered here is that to deal
with the dislocation resulting from increased personal physical injury and
illness, we will turn increasingly to systems of social insurance rather than
the law of torts.
With respect to improvement of the method for processing physical
injury claims in a technological society, the California Citizens Commis-




The Commission concludes that the tort system is now in deep trouble.
The combined effects of social and economic factors have created a level of
uncertainty that prevents the system from serving any, reasonable pattern of
priorities among the tort objectives. Whether one believes that the balance
of goals ought to emphasize compensation, or deterrence, or cost efficiency,
or safety incentives, or any other objective, the evidence suggests that the
current approach is far from the best instrument of social policy that can be
devised to deal with the critical issues of injury and compensation. The
recommendations of the Commission follow, beginning with those changes
that would apply to all areas of liability.
The most critical need is to subject the social ends and means represented
by the tort system to the same searching review and debate that democratic
societies give to other crucial public concerns. The most obvious anomaly in
the recent maelstrom of change in the tort system is that virtually all of the
alterations have occurred without any action by the Legislature. Although it
is entirely reasonable that judicial interpretation play a significant role in
spelling out and applying the law, the social principles that underlie the legal
rules should also reflect the actions of the elected representatives of the
people. It is not only feckless but unfair to criticize the Courts merely on the
ground that they have changed the tort law. The fact is that they have been left
to make the adjustments implied by fast-changing social circumstances
without statutory guidance by the bodies created to debate and decide social
questions. Given the limitations of the case-by-case process and the limited
analytic facilities provided in the Court system, it is not surprising that policy-
making in the tort area has had a fitful, lurching quality. The fault here is not
in our judges, but primarily in the failure of the rest of the policy-making
mechanism to address the questions pressed upon the judiciary, and to
provide sensible and authoritative answers.
To be more specific, we do not believe that the society should be required
to accept a tort system which:
Pays to injured people less than half of the dollars that it collects.
Systematically overcompensates the slightly injured and undercompen-
sates the seriously hurt.
Encourages use of the highest cost mechanism for resolution of disputes,
regardless of the scale of the injury or the issues that it presents.
Delays resolution of cases without regard to the financial capcity of the
injured to endure delay.
Provides no point in the decision process where the overall economic
effects of changes in rules of law can be taken into account.
Leaves every category of citizens-drivers, property owners, workers,
manufacturers, consumers, professionals, government officials,
taxpayers-ever more deeply in doubt about what their rights and
responsibilities are and how to provide for them.5
The Commission's indictment of the present system has the ring of an
Old Testament prophet's denunciation of sin. The assessment here is that
while the indictment is fairly returned, the prospect that tort law will be
5. CALIFORNIA CITIZENS COMMISSION ONTORT REFORM, RIGHTING TlE LiArnLITY BALANCE 10,
141 (1977).
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substantially reformed is a long-term rather than an immediate prospect.
Society will, however, finally address itself to the problems recognized by
the Commission, although we will be well into the next century before the
large portion of contemporary tort law that is concerned with compensa-
tion for physical injuries is supplanted.
Thus, by the middle of the next century, the future of tort law
controlling mass physical injury claims is no future at all. Tort law for
these physical injury claims will be supplanted by social insurance,
governmental, private or a meld of both. As a part of such a system, there
possibly may be a role for a "macro-tort claim" on behalf of the insurance
system against an industry or even an individual company whose product
or practices generated an identifiable number of injuries. Whether in
terms of possible deterrence, or allocation of accident costs to the activities
that generate the claims, there may be a function for such macro-
indemnification or contribution claims. The process employed, however,
will not resemble the present individual negligence trial. It is more likely
to resemble the rating system now used for determining auto insurance
premiums, although the rating system has been an exceedingly blunt
instrument. The voice speaking for the insurance system will almost
certainly be the voice of a computer or its successor device. Some general
approach to "internalizing" the accident costs of particular activities may
be seen as a desirable part of a social insurance system.
III. THE FUTURE OF TORT LAW LIES WITH PROTECTION
OF RELATIONAL INTERESTS
If the sun sets on negligence law for mass personal injury claims, that
will not by any means signal the end of the law of torts. There are a great
variety of important claims that would continue to call for individually
fashioned remedies before a tribunal comparable to present day courts or
administrative agencies. Dignitary torts do not occupy a great part of
the courts' time, but they must be heard if justice is to be done. Assault,
battery, false imprisonment, intrusion into privacy, and intentional
infliction of mental suffering will continue to call for redress. There are, as
well, financial and commercial interests to be protected against fraud and
misappropriation. Business torts will multiply. A civilized society can
surely provide more meaningful remedies for defamation and invasion of
privacy. In the participating, nondiscriminating society there will be a
great expansion of civil rights backed up by remedie; obtainable in court
or before some other tribunal. Activitites that impair the quality of life for
others nearby or distant, and protection of intellectual property from
misappropriation are among the claims that have called for special
remedies in the past; they will continue to call for special remedies in the
future. The central importance in the new society of affinity associations
and the continuing evolution of family relationships will mean that tort
law will be increasingly concerned with redressing wrongs to relational
(Vol. 39:782
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interests. All these claims have one common feature: they are highly
individualized, and, therefore require specially tailored remedies.
As we see the emerging central importance that protection of injuries
to relational interests will have in the tort law of the future, we must
acknowledge our debt to one of the great philosophers of tort law, Leon
Green. Nearly twenty years ago in a preface to a new, jointly edited
edition of his pioneering materials on relational interests he spoke as
follows:
Relational interests are set off against interests of personality and property as
a third dimension which gives freedom and precision in the use of legal theory
in dealing with many of the toughest problems arising out of the complexities
of the modern social order. The basic relations of our society are those of
trade, employment, family, neighbors and citizens.
Cases involving injuries to relations are three-party situations as
contrasted with the two-party situations found in injuries to person and
property. The relation may be hurt by a physical injury of one of the parties to
the relation, as for example the killing of a member of the family; by
appropriating the advantages of the relation or by destroying it, as for
example inducing one party to violate his contract with another; by impairing
the standing of a person in his community, as for example publishing an
accusation of his dishonesty in business or office; or by denying a person some
right he enjoys as a member of a social or political group, as for example the
right to vote or hold office or other right of citizenship.
Inasmuch as relational interests until lately were either ignored as
beyond the law's protection, or if recognized were dealt with by the courts as
interests of personality or property, much confusion has arisen with respect to
the remedies available for their protection. The orthodox common law
remedies based on damages have been frequently found unavailable or
inadequate, and extensions of damage rules have been required. Likewise
equitable remedies have been greatly expanded in bringing the rapidly
multiplying relational interests under the protection of law. Injunction,
declaratory judgment, receivership, accounting, implied contract, construc-
tive trust, unjust enrichment, estoppel and other equitable remedies are
commonplace in many relations cases and not infrequently provide the only
adequate remedies. Moreover the courts are in constant process of
fashioning new theories of liability for the protection of these interests, and
perhaps more than in any other area the creative spirit of law and equity is
constantly extending the frontiers of protection.
Suffice it to say that the relation as an interest recognized and protected
by law has taken its place on an equality withpersonality and property, and as
the social order becomes more and more dependent upon the group as the
core of its existence, the importance of relations will increase and courts and
legislatures will find their efforts more and more devoted to the adjustment
of relational conflicts.6
6. L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINs & A. S.MIT, Foreivord to lNUIREs
TO RELATIONS ix-x (1968) (emphasis in original).
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IV. SOME PARTING OBSERVATIONS
It will be a great day for tort law and its function in society when the
burden of processing relatively routine claims for unintended physical
injuries are removed from the courts and treated as a part of the larger so-
cial problem resulting from accident and sickness, with social insurance,
The very best part of tort law will remain. A great need for lawyering skills
will remain, for the common feature of tort claims of the future will be the
fashioning of individualized remedies appropriate to protect the interests
affected.
It is inevitable that the new torts will, to a much greater extent, be
enmeshed with and affected by legislation and administrative regulations.
That circumstance in itself is a considerable guarantee of the future of tort
law. The march towards greater regulation of society is inexorable. Cries
for return to a simpler era strike chords of nostalgia, but that is all.
Similarly, the propensity to submit disputes under new regulatory
systems to some formal tribunal, a court or some facsimile thereof, seems
endemic to our society.
So the answer, Virginia (and all your friends who are planning to
study law twenty, forty or sixty years from now), is that yes, there is and
will always be a law of torts. The field will be one of importance to society
and a challenge to the legal profession. The subject matter will continue to
be a staple of legal education. As a matter of fact, in the law schools torts
will improve as a fundamental and intellectually stimulating educational
experience. After all, negligence law, as an intellectual apparatus, has been
rather completely undressed by the realists to the point where the mystery
is largely gone.
But torts of the future will offer intellectual challenges aplenty for law
students, professors, lawyers and judges and administrators. The focus
will be not on claims for physical injuries but on assorted harms to
personal dignity, to financial interests, to interests in relationships with the
changing family, groups, traders, the community, the political system and
a variety of now unimagined claims to protect the quality and
opportunities of life for the individual citizen. To process and adjust those
claims in negotiation and before the appropriate forums will provide
challenge and reward for a legal profession that will ever more broadly
serve society in the century ahead.
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